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In recent years Japan’s hedge fund industry has been an increasingly popular destination  
 
for global investor allocations. Using a comprehensive database of returns and assets  
 
under management of Asian hedge funds we investigate the size flows, performance and other  
 
characteristics of Japan’s hedge fund industry. We have four main findings. First, we find that  
 
the industry has grown at a phenomenal rate since the second half of 2003, although the  
 
compound annual growth rate of assets appears to have slowed in the six months ending  
 
December 2005. Second, a time series of estimated dollar money-flows into/out of Japan’s  
 
hedge fund industry points to large inflows in recent years. These have been directed at  
 
long/short equity, directional equity and event driven strategies. Third, we note that the average  
 
asset-weighted or equal-weighted performance of Japan hedge funds under-performed traditional  
 
Japan equity benchmarks. Finally, we describe the prototypical hedge fund trading Japan as  
 
being a very small, Cayman Island-domiciled fund with its portfolio managers typically  
 
domiciled outside of Japan. Additionally, we note an increase in structures in which there is  
 
Japan-based investor advisor to the offshore fund. Overall, these findings improve our  
 








                                                
 
I.  Definition 
The definition of a hedge fund is imprecise. One commonly accepted definition is an 
investment vehicle organized as a private unregistered investment company, most often as a 
limited partnership, that enjoys considerably flexibility with respect to positions and instruments 
employed2. According to the MSCI a hedge fund is an investment company that hedges at least 
10% of its investment positions. In this case, MSCI allows for the inclusion of public investment 
companies (including mutual funds) within its definition3.  
The public data and news source, Hedge Fund Intelligence, defines an Asia-Pacific hedge 
fund as an entity charging a performance fee and either located in the Asia-Pacific investing in 
any strategy or located outside of the region but investing specifically in Asia-Pacific financial 
instruments4.  
For the purposes of this study, we define a Japanese hedge fund as an entity that charges 
a performance fee and irrespective of portfolio manager or fund domicile invests the bulk of it’s  
assets in Japanese equities and/or equity-related derivatives. The funds themselves can be hedged 
or not hedged, implying that the term hedge fund should best be considered a misnomer. 
 
II. Data Description 
A single database was constructed by merging two publicly available hedge fund data 
sets focusing on single manager hedge funds allocating capital to Japan. The reasoning was 
simple: we needed to create the biggest single dataset of hedge funds focusing on Japan  that 
 
2 John Marshall 
3 MSCI, see www.msci.com/hedge/ 
4 Paul Storey, AsiaHedge 
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excluded overlaps. The publicly available databases utilized were supplied by Hedge Fund 
Intelligence (“AsiaHedge”)5 and Eurekahedge (“Eurekahedge Asia”)6. These two databases are 
widely regarded as being the most comprehensive in terms of numbers of hedge funds covered in 
the Asia region.  
Another important aspect of this research involved the definition of hedge fund activity 
directed at Japanese financial markets. To do this, we had to create and allocate funds to 
geographical field definitions. Where not already classified by AsiaHedge or Eurekahedge Asia 
we subjectively classify each single manager hedge fund into one of the following five 
geographical categories: Japan, Asia including Japan, Asia excluding Japan, Global including 
Japan and Global excluding Japan. Our research concentrated on those geographies relevant to 
Japan, namely: Japan, Asia including Japan and Global including Japan. The focus was on 
single manager funds and not fund of hedge fund products. We did this knowing that the biggest 
data deficiencies relate to under-reporting by the databases of hedge funds belonging to the 
Global including Japan funds7 category. See Table I, Panel A: Distribution of Single Manager 
Hedge Funds across Regional Focus. 
To the extent that a small number of funds allocating to Japan have diversified their 
geographical investment mandates within existing fund operations we decided to re-classify 
those funds into their more recent and appropriate geographical definition. For example, a Japan-
 
5 AsiaHedge: www.hedgefundintelligence.com 
6 Eurekahedge: www.eurekahedge.com 
7 The State of the Hedge Fund Industry in Japan, Daiwa Securities America, Dec 2004, estimated that the Global 
including Japan category of the hedge fund universe allocating to Japan as follows: end 2001 US$44 BLN, mid 2002 
US$37 BLN, end 2002 US$21 BLN, mid 2003 46 BLN, end 2003 US$49 BLN, mid 2004 US$48 BLN. These 
estimates are considered “conservative” in that they assumed low levels of leverage. Those funds tended to be multi-
strategy in nature with a strong relative value approach to benefit from rising and falling market conditions. They 
also tend to command the largest assets and are opportunistic in approach. 
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only fund that in 2003 expanded to trade Korean equities would be classified under “Asia 
including Japan” from simply “Japan” in our analysis.  
We selected data time series in six month increments with assets under management as of 
the end of June and December for each year beginning with the figures for the end of 2001. In a 
number of instances the reliability of data time series beyond individual contact information and 
general net return information was disappointing. As hedge funds are not obligated to report their 
data to publicly available databases this is hardly a surprising phenomenon. Moreover, return 
information may be restated once results are audited at the end of a hedge fund’s reporting period 






                                                
 
III.  Assumptions   
There are a number of important specific assumptions underpinning this research. First, 
an unrealistic yet necessary assumption presupposes that most of the hedge funds in the selected 
universe transact in Japanese cash equities. This is clearly not realistic. The fact is that an 
insufficiency of data related to derivatives and non-cash assets prevents any clear identification 
of complete hedge fund activity8. That is simply a fact. By necessity we must assume that the 
hedge funds involved in Japan are primarily buyers and sellers of cash equities and that the vast 
majority are involved in the Japan long-short equity strategy.  In fact, the Japan long/short equity 
strategy accounts for 72% of all assets. See Table I. Panel B: Distribution of Single Manager 
Hedge Funds across Strategies. The reality may be somewhat different as many Global including 
Japan funds have been typically the biggest users of derivatives to execute relative value and 
market neutral strategies in addition to basket and pairs trading, convertibles transactions and the 
hedging of IPO and secondary market offerings.  
Second, Global including Japan funds such as macro, global long/short equity or multi-
strategy are all inadequately covered by the data. Their role in Japanese financial markets is 
substantive but often difficult to quantify. One way that they make money is in making top-down 
calls on asset allocation. This may take the form of changing strategy or geographical exposure 
and they also tend to be more aggressive users of leverage. Therefore, their investment approach 
opportunistic in terms of when and for how long they apply their global capital allocations. For 
 
8 Investors Guide, no. 337, January 2006, Daiwa Institute of Research, pp. 46 & 52. For the first 9 months of 2005 
the trading value of TOPIX and Nikkei 225 equity futures amounted to ¥2,416,147 (in 100 mil) while total value of 
stocks traded on Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya main exchanges amounted to ¥5,581,770 (in 100 mil) with no way of 
knowing how much of this trading activity is attributable to hedge funds, and whether they are funds tracked by the 
merged database used in this research.  
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example, a promising new equity issuance or IPO out of Japan might tempt participation by a 
Global including Japan fund on the encouragement of its prime broker. This is a potentially big 
“hole” in our understanding of the overall impact of hedge funds in Japan. Depending on the 
nature of the market cycle many are believed to constitute the biggest sources of capital 
impacting Japanese financial markets given their significant size advantage over typical Japan 
long/short equity funds9.  
 Third, this research does not account for gross or net leverage changes over time. An 
important consideration in analyzing hedge funds necessarily accounts for the issue of leverage. 
Typically, leverage enables a hedge fund manager to hold a bigger position in an underlying 
asset (usually cash equities). An appreciation of the likely average leverage utilized by the single 
manager allocating to Japan might be beneficial in understanding the impact of hedge fund 
capital on the major exchanges. For the purposes of the database, average net exposure (total 
cash equity long positions minus total cash equity short positions) runs from -10% to 50% and 
average gross exposure (total cash equity long positions plus total cash equity short positions) 
runs from 80% to 150%10. This is important as it provides pretty substantial evidence that a 
majority of Japan long/short equity funds will tend to utilize leverage on the long side as opposed 
the short side in their investment approach.   
Fourth, a hedge fund’s exposure to Japanese financial markets is likely to be dynamic and 
not stationary as implied in this research. A frequently overlooked consideration in analyzing 
hedge funds managers in Japan is their frequently changing exposure to the market. Once a fund 
 
9 Source: Lipper TASS, www.hedgeworld.com (mean size of a multi-strategy fund as at end 2005, excluding foreign 
currency denominated classes, was US$220 MLN and this typically excludes a number of the biggest multi-strategy 
funds that do not report to commercially available hedge databases) 
10 Based solely upon reported data to the Eurekahedge database of funds 
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has been assigned a geographical designation (Japan focus, Asia including Japan or Global) one 
must take into account the amount of exposure the allocation is likely to be in Japan. In reality a 
manager may have some flexibility depending on market circumstances. For the research we 
assigned fixed percentage allocations and held them constant over time. For example, Japan 
long/short equity managers were assumed to allocate 100% of capital to Japan. However an Asia 
including Japan manager was assumed to allocate 30% of capital to Japan with global managers 
a mere 10% of capital to Japan. We believe that these are conservative assumptions and in many 
cases they might not reflect the reality of a market cycle, position liquidity or any other number 
of reasons.  
 Fifth, the role of “dead”, “obsolete” or “graveyard” funds is almost certainly 
understated. While both AsiaHedge and Eurekahedge databases provided breakdowns of single 
manager funds that are no longer reporting their data to them, access to detailed asset or even 
performance data history was incomplete and in a large number of cases inconsistent. Clearly, 
this introduces a significant bias in any overall assessment of time series performance. See Table 
I Panel C: Single Manager Hedge Funds allocating to Japan (Live Funds) and Panel D: Single 
Manager Hedge Funds allocating to Japan (Dead funds). 
Sixth, the research also excludes other potentially relevant additional data points. A not 
insignificant amount of capital allocated by hedge funds in Japan is currently run in managed 
accounts. Managed accounts are often run pari passu with normal fund operations although their 
performance and assets under management are usually not reported to databases. The precise 
scope and scale of these repositories is unclear but certainly, they provide yet another area for 
imprecision in the definition of the universe in the sense of an under-reporting asset under 
management bias.  
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Additionally, there are a number of more general problems which will always lead to 
overestimation of hedge fund performance. All of these problems are likely to be present in our 
Japan hedge fund data analysis. Previous research has already pointed out the various pitfalls of 
working with hedge fund data including survivorship biases, instant history bias and selection 
bias (Ackerman, McEnally, and Ravenscroft, 1999; Brown, Goetzmann, and Ibbotson 1999; 
Fung and Hsieh, 2000; and Liang, 2000). Survivorship bias occurs when a hedge fund suddenly 
drops out of the reporting universe. A big part of the manager’s fees are paid as an incentive, 
typically 20% of performance. If the strategy collapses, rather than waiting for the fund to 
generate returns back over its previous high which would take time and generate low or even no 
fees for the manager, he might be close the fund and start another one with a new track record. 
Instant history bias or backfill bias can be significant and occurs when hedge funds with good 
historical performance decide to report and data providers backfill their databases to show this 
track record. Selection bias describes to two possible situations. First, managers who are not 
interested in increasing assets or who can raise sufficient funds on their own have no incentive to 
participate in a database. Second, hedge fund managers with poor performance might also 
choose not to participate. It might be logical to assume that the number of managers in the 
second category is likely to outnumber those in the first. Yet another issue relates to security 
pricing bias. For relatively illiquid securities that do not actively trade in the secondary market 
any end of month mark-to-market valuation may be subject to over or under estimation by a 
hedge fund manager if there is no consistent third party verification process. This might 
conceivably lead to overvaluation of hedge fund performance, in particular around the time prior 
to the calculation and payment of a manager’s incentive fee. This might be a factor in some of 
Japan’s less liquid small cap security trades. 
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IV.  Results 
Estimated assets under management of hedge funds allocating to Japan grew 19% over  
 
the final six months of 2005 to US$54.8 BLN. This was US$15.1 BLN or 38% over the  
 
previous six month period and while appearing high, it marked a slow down from mid  
 
year 2003 to end 2004 when assets grew well over 40% every six months. Why? We believe we  
 
that a first wave or investment tsunami from global investors took place from the second half of  
 
2003. These investors were typically high net worth individuals, family offices, private banks  
 
and fund of hedge fund operators. These types of investors typically do not have rigid and or  
 
inflexible investment mandates and they typically try to employ tactical asset allocation (in this  
 
case geographical in nature). As the traditional equity markets have shown renewed vigor it is  
 
possible that the other larger institutional investors with existing long-only mutual fund type  
 
exposure in Japan might start to look at hedge fund allocations not so much for the exposure to a  
 
rising equity market as much as for diversification from their equity market exposure.  Looking  
 
ahead, we estimate that hedge fund asset growth may slow to a more sustainable rate in 
 
the low to mid teens every six months.  
 
It would be interesting to consider what the size of Japan’s hedge fund industry would be  
 
if we made some assumptions regarding the estimated assets of Global including Japan funds11.  
 
Many Global including Japan funds have been visibly ramping up trading operations  
 
and research capabilities in Asia  over the last 24 months. For many of them, Japan continues to  
 
be a primary reason for this heightened business activity and the primarily goal for their  
 
11 Applying the same ratio of Global including Japan hedge fund category used in The State of the Hedge Fund 
industry in Japan, mid year 2004, Daiwa Securities America, would produce a likely end 2005 figure of US$91 BLN 
for a grand total of US$146 BLN for all hedge funds allocating to Japan. Applying this over the total market value 
of Tokyo Stock Exchange Section 1 & 2 market value would suggest that hedge funds accounted for 33% of TSE 









Fund Assets under Management. Table II shows the summary statistics for the 2001 to 
2005 period. In 2001 based on total assets under management of US$12.9 BLN the mean of 
Japan hedge funds employing equity market neutral strategies was US$245 million. Note that 
equity market neutral emphasized downside protection due to the “hedged” nature of the 
investment style, a feature that would have made sense to institutional investors both overseas 
and domestic. In contrast, for the second half of 2005, mean equity market neutral assets under 
management fell to US$101 million. One possible explanation might be that investors have 
become risk tolerant with the switch away from capital preservation to absolute return 
symptomatic of investors chasing beta or market returns.  
Also noteworthy has been the rapid growth in the mean assets controlled by event  
 
driven funds. They increased from under US$100 million at the end of 2004 to over  
 
US$400 million by 2005 reflecting the burst in activity in Japan’s nascent mergers and  
 
acquisitions, LBOs and investor activist opportunities.12  
 
 In contrast, mean assets in the long/short equity strategy have moved steadily higher from  
 
US$104 million in 2001 to US$180 million by the end of 2005. The higher mean size probably  
 
reflects the fact the fact that the majority of established managers rather than start-up managers  
 
were successful in garnering investment allocations. It might also reflect the fact that a number  
 
of the start-ups were “seeded” by established managers opening new strategies or “re-opening”  
 
                                                 
12 In 2003, CalPERS teamed up with Sparx Asset Management in Japan and Relational Investors LLC in California 
to set up a pilot Japan Corporate Governance Fund. 
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previously closed funds in light of the better liquidity conditions in Japanese equity markets.  
  
 
Fund Net Flows. Table III. Net Dollar Flows and the relationship with Japan hedge fund 
performance displays the time series of dollar asset flows into Japan hedge funds. Net flows are 
aggregated and broken down by strategy. Net flows try to account for the effect of performance 
of a particular strategy in addition to asset inflows and outflows. To do so, the research relied 
upon six month time periods of asset data with performance netted out on a fund by fund basis to 
calculate the net flows for each fund i during time t according to the following  
Net flowit = AUMi,t – AUMi,t-1(1+Ri,t) 
Where AUMi,t and AUMi,t-1 are assets under management for fund i at the end of the six month 
period t and t-1 and Ri,t is the return for fund i during the six month period denoted by t. As 
explained earlier we had to rely on the six monthly periods because of the lack of reliable asset 
under management data on a monthly period in the examined databases. 
 Once we constructed a time series of net fund flow data we compared this to a time series 
of performance data in order to eyeball the relationship between net flows and performance. In 
order to account for any potential confusion related to definition of performance, we took 
account of the equal-weighted and asset-weighted definitions (where the assets under 
management of the fund are taken into account).  
The findings show that high net inflows periods ending Dec 2003 (US$8.2 BLN), Jun 04 
(US$10.2 BLN) and Dec 2004 (US$10 BLN) mirrored periods in which traditional equity 
benchmarks such as the Nikkei 225 index and MSCI Japan put up strong gains with the biggest 
inflows occurring in six-month periods when those same benchmarks posted high positive 
returns. This appears to be more reliable than the performance spread between asset-weighted 
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hedge funds in the data set and a traditional benchmark like the MSCI Japan Index or Nikkei 225 
Index.  
This begs the question whether it is indeed the absolute performance of Japan that alone 
triggers positive dollar inflows into Japan’s hedge fund industry or rather the relationship of 
hedge fund performance relative to traditional benchmarks. If one looks at six-month period 
returns related to the Nikkei 225 equity index and the MSCI Japan index then for four out of 
eight periods the equal-weighted and asset-weighted hedge fund performance return is above that 
of their traditional equity only benchmarks. Certainly, more analysis needs to take place  
(with longer time series) in order to better understand more specific aspects of hedge fund 
performance, such as the relationship and role of between median and top quartile performers in 
addition to relative performance measures in the fund flow decision-making process. 
 
Table IV. shows Net Dollar Flows by Strategy. Long/short equity (LSE) and event driven 
(ED) strategies gained US$14.1 BLN and US$1.9BLN respectively in net inflows during 2005. 
In contrast, equity market neutral (EMN) and multi-strategy (MS) experienced declines of 
US$0.1 BLN and a gain of US$0.3 BLN respectively over the same period. Given the impressive 
performance of the Nikkei 225 Index and MSCI Japan indices over the second half of 2005, one 
must wonder whether similarly large scale capacity still exists in the Japan long short space. By 
some industry estimates approximately 65%-70% of all Japan hedge funds over the US$500 MM 
assets under management barrier are closed13. Back in 2002/03 when there was no as much 
 




liquidity in the equity markets the point at which Japan funds “closed” was down to US$300 
MM14. 
See Chart I: Net Dollar Flows vs. Hedge Fund and Nikkei 225 Performance (2001-2005).  
One can see clearly that there is a directional relationship between hedge fund returns, the Nikkei 
225 and net flows. 
Chart 2 shows the relationship between Foreign Equity Balances at TSE, Osaka and 
Nagoya (purchases minus sales) vs. Net Flows into Japan Hedge Funds. Different scales aside, 
this graphic would appear to support the earlier comment that hedge fund flows might be closely 
related to general market liquidity flows into the equity market, where that liquidity is defined as 
coming from the investor category known as “foreigners”. There are anecdotal differences in the 
investing behavior of domestic Japanese investors and foreign investors. The former consist of 
domestic institutional and domestic retail investors. Japanese domestic institutional investors 
have been historically “buy and hold” investors with tie-ups in cross-shareholdings limiting the 
available equity free float. In contrast Japanese retail investors have been traditionally more 
active in Japanese equity sector rotation. In contrast, foreign investors have been perceived to 
opportunistic investors and typically viewed as having more skill. Certainly, a vast number of 
foreign investors (including hedge funds) were active in the second half of 2003 buying a 
number of industries, such as under-valued banking real estate stocks on the perceptions that 
they would benefit an economic revival of Japan’s economy.  
 
Numbers of Funds. Chart VIII. Distribution of Hedge Funds allocating to Japan 2001-
2005, shows that the steady growth in fund numbers that have been observed in the data. By 
                                                 
14 Various Japan equity market sources 
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category, Japan funds totaled 209 by the end of 2005 versus 73 at the end of 2001. The number 
of Asia including Japan funds was 160 versus 55 at the end of 2001, while the numbers of funds 
in the Global funds including Japan remained fairly insignificant in the data at 376.  
Table I. Panels C and D provide simple counts of the numbers of Japan hedge funds 
identified and allocated across geographical categories for live and dead (obsolete) funds. A “live 
fund” is one that is a going-concern reporting monthly net of fee performance and assets under 
management at the very least every six months. For both publicly available databases, Japan only 
managers constituted the largest single source of data for hedge funds used in this study. The 
Asia excluding Japan category (not analyzed in this research) contained the largest number of 
managers in either database. As has already been pointed out, the data is based upon a very small 
number of Global funds (including Japan). 
A “dead” or “obsolete fund” is one that, for a variety of reasons no longer reports to a 
public database. In the case of dead funds, there are only a slightly higher proportion of dead 
funds originating from the Japan-only category of hedge funds. This might reflect the longer 
history of hedge fund formation and mortality for Japan-only hedge funds relative to Asia 
including Japan or Global funds allocating to Japan. 
  
Distribution of Live and Dead Funds. Table I. Panel B displays the live and dead Japan hedge 
fund distribution across all strategies. It shows percentages according to total assets under 
management for live funds and dead funds. Clearly, long short equity strategy commands the 
vast majority of assets at just over 72% followed by equity market neutral (9%) and multi-
strategy (6.7%) then global macro (5%). While convertible arbitrage has fallen back in terms of 
representation the multi-strategy category increased. Historically, multi-strategy managers 
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started out as convertible arbitrage managers so this is not to be considered an unusual 
observation. Further, with increased competition in the convertibles business, a change in Japan 
tax treatment and dwindling liquidity and pricing there was a gradual shift into other market 
neutral strategies including basket trading, pairs trading, statistical arbitrage and event driven 
opportunities. With the unraveling of industrial cross-shareholdings the role of multi-strategy 
hedge funds in the risk arbitrage, event space should not be surprising and is likely to continue 
just as it is that specific local funds emerge to fill that specialized investment space. 
 
Distribution of Funds.  According to Chart IV. showing the Distribution of Total Hedge 
Funds allocating to Japan by Size, and Chart V. showing Distribution of Total Hedge Funds 
allocating to Japan by Number, four hedge funds with assets over US$1 BLN control 15% of 
industry capital. In terms of number of funds, 215 hedge funds or 64% of the total have assets 
under management of less than US$100 MM.  Again, it should be remembered that these results 
do not account for Global including Japan hedge funds which are believed to be sizeable 
allocators to the region and its markets. It also, points out that there are a great number of smaller 
funds which typically prove difficult investment opportunities for large institutional investors 
who are typically restricted by factors such as length of track record and assets under 
management among other things. More research needs to be done to identify which of these 
smaller funds are independent managers or off-shoot strategies of larger established firms. Also, 
it would be interesting to understand which funds gravitate to “established funds” from 
“emerging funds” and whether there are common success traits. 
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Distribution by Regional Category. Panel A reflects the distribution of single manager 
hedge funds by regional focus. The databases cover Japan and Asia inc. Japan funds but global 
funds given the meager 4.04% allocation. 
 
Cross Sectional Fund Distribution. Table V. illustrates the cross sectional characteristics 
of single manager hedge funds in the combined database for live funds. For management fees 
there are no obvious surprises beyond the fact that median management fees for equity market 
neutral strategy is below the 1.50%-2.00% norm exhibited over other strategies. Perhaps, this 
may be a marketing strategy given that they are most likely sold to Japanese institutional 
investors searching for equity diversification strategies and performance over and above some 
equity benchmark. Mean performance fees by managers are almost uniformly similar at 20% 
with a smaller number including even higher fees over a hurdle and high water mark. Aggregate 
management fees accrued in Japan’s hedge fund industry are estimated to have been substantial15 
and so it is not surprising that there have been increasing numbers of service providers (prime 
brokers, administrators, custodians, attorneys and auditors keen to engage in the growing 
industry. Looking ahead, it might be the case for some exceptional fund performers (as in the 
US) that they will change their fees with less emphasis on the management fee and more on the 
performance fee. It will probably take a few more years for some of these top performers to 
establish themselves as well as their respective performance reputations assuming that market 
liquidity and opportunities continue to expand. 
 
                                                 
15 Assuming average fees of 2 and 20, income plus capital gains of US$15.1 BLN, administrative fees of 0.4% and a 
hurdle rate of 5% leads us to estimate that total manager fees generated from Japan hedge funds exceeded US$3.8 
BLN at the end of 2005. 
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Fund Age. In terms of the monthly age of Japan hedge fund managers, event driven and 
multi-strategy managers are “youngest” in terms of mean monthly age at 24 months and 32 
months respectively. This is likely to reflect the fact that it is only in recent times that scalable 
event and multi-strategies have become profitable or even scalable businesses in Japan. This may 
also coincide with the growth of equity market activity in Japan equity benchmarks since the 
summer of 2003. Managed futures managers clearly have been around a lot longer given the 
mean average existence of close to 60 months or five years. In comparison, Japan long/short 
equity (LSE) has a mean existence of 39 months. Further research may be needed to investigate 
age and fund attrition, with a particular emphasis on the factors that might divide those managers 
that become established and those that are and/or remain emerging or fail altogether. 
 
Fund Returns. Mean net of fee returns for hedge funds trading Japan fall in a 5.15% to a 
24.67% range. For event driven and managed futures managers (MF) mean returns hit the low 
20s while that for long/short equity (LSE) was a respectable 13.38%. A look at the spread 
between the median and top performance is widest for managed futures at 25.17%, then global 
macro at 6.77% and long short equity at 6.08%. Clearly, there appears to be a considerable 
advantage derived from selecting top quartile performers even on an absolute return basis. This 
maybe one reason investors have been so anxious to allocate to Japan over the last 2-3 years. 
They all hope to be invested in top quartile performers and while it is typically true that the best 
fund managers are “closed” anecdotal evidence suggests that even those funds that are “closed” 
may in fact be filtering out their investor profile – filtering out so-called hot money investors 
(like certain fund of hedge funds) favoring instead larger allocations and more sticky institutional 
allocations from pension plans and endowments. Note, that returns in this research are 
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predominantly dollar denominated with no consideration of currency impacts. Further research 
needs to be conducted in this area to examine more closely quartile performance time series and 
the issue of net flows and potential decreasing returns.  
 
Fund Volatility. For a comparison of standard deviation across strategies (monthly rates 
annualized for funds since inception to June 2005), results show that the lowest mean volatility is 
displayed by the equity market neutral strategy. This is what one would expect given the typical 
definition of this strategy. The highest exhibited volatility was evident among managed futures 
then global macro strategies. Mean standard deviation for the long/short equity strategy stood at 
10.57% which compares to over 16% for the Nikkei 225 average since Dec 2001. Further 
research should probably be directed at the issue of the extent to which the nature of a particular 
strategy has on the dispersion of returns. 
 
Manager Domicile. According to Chart VI. Distribution of Hedge Funds allocating to 
Japan by Manager Domicile, the vast majority of capital can be traced to portfolio managers that 
are situated in the UK (US$16.4 BLN), Japan (US$11.4 BLN) and then the US (US$10.1 BLN). 
Typically, the portfolio manager acts as the sub-advisor to an offshore fund management entity. 
The reasons for might be variously traced to higher start-up costs in Japan, lower personal tax 
rates in various non-Japan centers (e.g. Singapore), the availability if skilled staff and a 




Fund Domicile. According to Chart VII. Distribution of Hedge Funds allocating to Japan 
by Fund Domicile close to 60% of total hedge fund capital is directed at fund Cayman Island 
fund structures followed by the British Virgin Island and then Bermuda jurisdictions. 
 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
  
In this paper, we have tried to analyze the main characteristics at play in Japan’s hedge 
fund industry including the net dollar flows using a composite database of hedge funds 
constructed by merging the AsiaHedge and Eurekahedge Asia databases. 
We have four main findings. First, total estimated capital before leverage in Japan’s 
hedge fund industry reached US$54.8 BLN by the end of December 2005. Second, money-flows 
(net dollar flows less fund performance) into Japan’s hedge fund industry grew US$10 BLN  in 
the final six montsh of 2005 and have grown at an impressive 30% rate every six months since 
2003. The growth rate has probably less to do with the actual absolute returns posted by the top 
quartile funds since 2003 as much as a tsunami of liquidity provided by “foreigners” on Japan’s 
main equity exchanges as measured by the net stock purchases. The bulk of money flows have 
been directed at hedged equity (long/short equity), directional equity (investor activist) and event 
driven strategies. Third, since Japan’s stock market recovery in April 2003, both equal and asset-
weighted hedge fund performance across a range of strategies have lagged traditional equity 
benchmarks (by an average of 5.39% for 4 out of 5 six-monthly periods). This suggests that there 
may be other reasons behind investor allocations to Japan hedge funds beyond the argument of 
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absolute returns16. And lastly, Japan’s hedge fund industry continues to be dominated by the 
prototypical small long/short equity manager with less than US$100 MM, who runs a Cayman 
Island-domiciled fund with the portfolio management team typically domiciled in the UK or the 
US.  
This research confirms that Japan’s hedge fund industry is one of the fastest growing in 
the world, while remaining still relatively small against the North American and European hedge 
fund industries17. Although Japan’s hedge fund capital represents only 4% of the global hedge 
fund industry, we estimate that even if net money inflows slow to a 10-15% pace every six 
months (from the current 30% growth rate) then ceteris paribus Japan’s hedge fund industry 
should breach the US$100 BLN barrier by the middle of 2008.  
 
We believe that further research could be directed at the following issues:  the 
phenomenon of diminishing returns across hedge fund strategies; the role of hedge fund size as a 
determinant of fund performance; a description of investors in Japan’s hedge fund industry and, 





16 Additional arguments used to justify the investments in hedge funds include: potential positive returns in all 
market conditions, superior risk-adjusted returns, a low or negative correlation to other asset classes, and the ability 
to increase the level of diversification. 
17 See Chart XV. Global Hedge Fund allocations to single managers by geography shows Japan represents 4% of the 
global hedge fund industry, Europe 25% and US/Rest of the World 68%. Japan represents approx. 55-60% of total 
Asian hedge fund capital.  
 
 23
List of Tables & Charts 
 
Table I: Breakdown of Funds by Data Source 
Panel A: Distribution of Single Manager Hedge Funds across Regional Focus 
Panel B: Distribution of Single Hedge Funds allocating to Japan across Strategies 
Panel C: Single Manager Hedge Funds allocating to Japan (Live funds) 
Panel D: Single Manager Hedge Funds allocating to Japan (Dead funds) 
Table II: Assets Under Management: Trends in Hedge Funds allocating to Japan 
Table III: Net Dollar Flows and the relationship with Japan hedge fund performance 
Table IV: Net Dollar Flows by Strategy 
Table V: Cross Sectional Fund Characteristics of Single Manager Hedge Funds allocating 
to Japan (live funds as of June 2005) 
Chart I: Japan Hedge Fund Net Dollar Flows vs. Hedge Fund Asset Weighted Return  
and Nikkei 225 Performance (2001-2005) 
Chart II: Foreign Equity Balances (TSE, Osaka, Nagoya) vs. Net Flows into Japan Hedge 
Funds 
Chart III. Trend Growth in Assets Japan’s Hedge Fund Industry by Assets Under 
Management 
Chart IV: Distribution of Total Hedge Funds allocating to Japan by Size 
Chart V: Distribution of Total Hedge Funds allocating to Japan by Number 
Chart VI: Distribution of Hedge Funds allocating to Japan by Manager Domicile 
Chart VII: Distribution of Hedge Funds allocating to Japan by Fund Domicile 
Chart VIII: Distribution of Numbers of Hedge Funds allocating to Japan, 2001-2005 
 
 24
Chart XV: Global Hedge Funds allocations to single managers by geography 




Table I: Breakdown of Funds by Data Sources 
 
Panel A shows the breakdown of hedge funds across various geographical categories. Panel B 
shows the number of live single hedge fund manager funds contained in the AsiaHedge and 
Eurekahedge Asia databases. Panel B shows the number of single hedge fund manager dead 
funds (otherwise referred to as obsolete or graveyard funds) in the same databases. Panel C 
shows the breakdown of funds across strategies while  
 
 
Panel A: Distribution of Single Manager Hedge Funds across Regional Focus  
 
Fund Type Live Dead 
Japan funds 57.24% 54.67%
Asia inc. Japan funds 38.72% 24.54%











 Panel B: Distribution of Single Manager Hedge Funds allocating to Japan across Strategies  
Strategy Live Dead 
Convertible Arbitrage 0.67% 7.92% 
Equity Market Neutral 9.03% 15.84%
Event Driven 2.34% 2.97% 
Fixed Income Arbitrage 1.00% 0.00% 
Global Macro 5.02% 11.88%
Long Short Equity 72.58% 56.44%
Managed Futures 0.00% 3.96% 
Multi-Strategy 6.69% 0.00% 
 Source: selected AsiaHedge and Eurekahedge Asia hedge fund data 
 
Panel C: Single Manager Hedge Funds allocating to Japan (Live funds) 
Source Live Japan Asia inc. Japan Global Asia exc. Japan Missing data  
AsiaHedge 482 170 115 12 184 110 
EurekaHedge 511 155 140 13 204 27 







 Panel D: Single Manager Hedge Funds allocating to Japan (Dead funds) 
Source Dead Japan Asia inc. Japan Global Asia exc. Japan 
AsiaHedge 101 38 25 21 17 
EurekaHedge 79 26 17 18 14 
 
Source: selected AsiaHedge and Eurekahedge Asia hedge fund data 
 
Table II. Assets Under Management: Trends in Hedge Funds allocating to Japan 
 
This table shows the summary statistics for second half 2001 
Strategy million$  EMN ED GM LSE MF MS 
Assets Under Management 
































Source: selected AsiaHedge and Eurekahedge Asia hedge fund data; fund strategies based upon CS-Tremont hedge fund definitions 
with EMN equity market neutral, ED event driven, GM global macro, LSE long/short equity, MF managed futures and MS multi-
strategy. 
This table shows the summary statistics for first half 2002 
Strategy million$  EMN ED GM LSE MF MS 
Assets Under Management 

































Source: selected AsiaHedge and Eurekahedge Asia hedge fund data; fund strategies based upon CS-Tremont hedge fund definitions 
with EMN equity market neutral, ED event driven, GM global macro, LSE long/short equity, MF managed futures and MS multi-
strategy. 
 This table shows the summary statistics for second half 2002 
 
 
Strategy million$  EMN ED GM LSE MF MS 
Assets Under Management 
































Source: selected AsiaHedge and Eurekahedge Asia hedge fund data; fund strategies based upon CS-Tremont hedge fund definitions 
with EMN equity market neutral, ED event driven, GM global macro, LSE long/short equity, MF managed futures and MS multi-
strategy. 
This table shows the summary statistics for first half 2003 
Strategy million$  EMN ED GM LSE MF MS 
Assets Under Management 
































Source: selected AsiaHedge and Eurekahedge Asia hedge fund data; fund strategies based upon CS-Tremont hedge fund definitions 
with EMN equity market neutral, ED event driven, GM global macro, LSE long/short equity, MF managed futures and MS multi-
strategy. 
This table shows the summary statistics for second half 2003 
Strategy million$  EMN ED GM LSE MF MS 
Assets Under Management 


































Source: selected AsiaHedge and Eurekahedge Asia hedge fund data; fund strategies based upon CS-Tremont hedge fund definitions 
with EMN equity market neutral, ED event driven, GM global macro, LSE long/short equity, MF managed futures and MS multi-
strategy. 
 This table shows the summary statistics for first half 2004 
Strategy million$  EMN ED GM LSE MF MS 
Assets Under Management 
































Source: selected AsiaHedge and Eurekahedge Asia hedge fund data; fund strategies based upon CS-Tremont hedge fund definitions 
with EMN equity market neutral, ED event driven, GM global macro, LSE long/short equity, MF managed futures and MS multi-
strategy. 
This table shows the summary statistics for second half 2004 
Strategy million$  EMN ED GM LSE MF MS 
Assets Under Management 
































Source: selected AsiaHedge and Eurekahedge Asia hedge fund data; fund strategies based upon CS-Tremont hedge fund definitions 
with EMN equity market neutral, ED event driven, GM global macro, LSE long/short equity, MF managed futures and MS multi-
strategy. 
This table shows the summary statistics for first half 2005 
Strategy million$  EMN ED GM LSE MF MS 
Assets Under Management 
































Source: selected AsiaHedge and Eurekahedge Asia hedge fund data; fund strategies based upon CS-Tremont hedge fund definitions 
with EMN equity market neutral, ED event driven, GM global macro, LSE long/short equity, MF managed futures and MS multi-
strategy. 
This table shows the summary statistics for second half 2005 
Strategy million$  EMN ED GM LSE MF MS 
Assets Under Management 































Source: selected AsiaHedge and Eurekahedge Asia hedge fund data; fund strategies based upon CS-Tremont hedge fund definitions 
with EMN equity market neutral, ED event driven, GM global macro, LSE long/short equity, MF managed futures and MS multi-
strategy. 
 





































Dec 01 12.97 - 4.74% 5.88% -23.05% 27.79% -18.71% 
Jun 02 13.69 0.9 5.28% 8.48% 8.16% -2.88% 0.75% 
Dec 02 13.83 2.2 -0.30% 1.67% -17.05% 16.75% -19.23% 
Jun 03 14.68 4.6 7.57% 8.23% 2.92% 4.65% 5.88% 
Dec 03 21.22 8.2 16.07% 14.11% 32.05% -15.88% 17.54% 
Jun 04 32.51 10.2 3.50% 2.98% 10.73% -7.27% 11.07% 
Dec 04 39.67 2.2 4.46% 2.77% 4.63% -0.17% -3.12% 
Jun 05 46.24 6.8 3.16% 3.92% -5.84% 9.00% 0.84% 




Source: selected AsiaHedge and Eurekahedge Asia hedge fund data, MSCI (Morgan Stanley Capital International) is the owner of 
the trademark, service mark and copyright related to the MSCI Japan Index; Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. is the owner of the 
trademark, service marks, and copy rights related to the Nikkei 225 Index.







Dec 01 N/A 17.84% 
Jun 02 0.069 -10.84% 
Dec 02 167.01 1.53% 
Jun 03 -0.383 -5.45% 
Dec 03 0.133 19.48% 
Jun 04 0.406 33.60% 
Dec 04 0.276 6.04% 
Jun 05 3.7 6.97% 
Dec 05 8.8 7.72% 
 
 
Source: selected AsiaHedge and Eurekahedge Asia hedge fund data; fund strategies based upon CS-Tremont hedge fund definitions 







Dec 01 N/A 2.45% 
Jun 02 53.732 4.01% 
Dec 02 150.33 4.35% 
Jun 03 709.00 3.72% 
Dec 03 -357.99 12.90% 
Jun 04 1403.48 3.37% 
Dec 04 969.17 1.92% 
Jun 05 300.4 1.85% 
Dec 05 -381. 0.83% 
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Source: selected AsiaHedge and Eurekahedge Asia hedge fund data; fund strategies based upon CSF-Tremont hedge fund definitions 
including EMN for equity market neutral strategy 






Dec 01 N/A 7.16% 
Jun 02 8.57 24.01% 
Dec 02 2.53 11.12% 
Jun 03 158.74 7.14% 
Dec 03 107.41 19.93% 
Jun 04 421.82 -2.76% 
Dec 04 446.17 5.56% 
Jun 05 708.60 3.90% 
Dec 05 1,221.3 20.68% 
 
 
Source: selected AsiaHedge and Eurekahedge Asia hedge fund data; fund strategies based upon CS-Tremont hedge fund definitions 







Dec 01 N/A 14.97% 
Jun 02 9.56 4.52% 
Dec 02 -526.14 2.52% 
Jun 03 19.17 6.90% 
Dec 03 131.78 11.61% 
Jun 04 43.87 9.26% 
Dec 04 -46.09 3.86% 
Jun 05 346.60 2.04% 




Source: selected AsiaHedge and Eurekahedge Asia hedge fund data; fund strategies based upon CS-Tremont hedge fund definitions 







Dec 01 N/A 5.11% 
Jun 02 743.99 5.31% 
Dec 02 2392.97 -0.49% 
Jun 03 3246.04 8.37% 
Dec 03 7531.58 16.75% 
Jun 04 7871.50 3.37% 
Dec 04 667.19 5.00% 
Jun 05 4974.50 3.69% 
Dec 05 9239.62 17.28% 
 
 
Source: selected AsiaHedge and Eurekahedge Asia hedge fund data; fund strategies based upon CS-Tremont hedge fund definitions 







Dec 01 N/A 5.11% 
Jun 02 73.32 5.31% 
Dec 02 -5.36 -0.49% 
Jun 03 469.36 8.37% 
Dec 03 837.33 16.75% 
Jun 04 475.46 3.37% 
Dec 04 155.00 5.00% 
Jun 05 520.70 3.69% 
Dec 05 -224.2 20.22% 
 
 
Source: selected AsiaHedge and Eurekahedge Asia hedge fund data; fund strategies based upon CS-Tremont hedge fund definitions 
including MS for multi-strategy 
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Table V: Cross Sectional Characteristics of Single Manager Hedge Funds allocating to Japan 




 EMN ED GM LSE MF MS 


















































































































 Source: selected AsiaHedge and Eurekahedge Asia hedge fund data, as of June 2005 
 
 
                                                 
 
 34
18 Strategy Key: EMN is equity market neutral, ED is event driven, GM is global macro, LSE is long/short equity, 
MF is managed futures and MS is multi-strategy all defined in the content of the CSFB-Tremont strategies. 
Chart I. Japan Hedge Fund Net Dollar Flows vs. Hedge Fund Asset-Weighted Return and Nikkei 






















































Asset-Weighted Return Nikkei 225 Net Flow
 Source: selected AsiaHedge and Eurekahedge Asia hedge fund data, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. is the owner of the trademark, 
service marks, and copyright related to the Nikkei 225 Index. 
 


























































































Source: selected AsiaHedge and Eurekahedge Asia hedge fund data; Investor’s Guide no.337, January 2006, Daiwa Institute of 
Research 
































Japan funds Asia inc. Japan funds Global (incl. Japan) funds
 
Since mid 2003 allocations by 
hedge funds to Japan have grown 
an avg. of 34% every 6 months, 
with recent growth slowing 
 Source: selected AsiaHedge and Eurekahedge Asia hedge fund data 
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64% of Hedge Funds allocating to Japan 
are less than US$100 Mil in size 
           Source: selected AsiaHedge and Eurekahedge Asia hedge fund data as of June 2005 
 
Chart VI. Distribution of Hedge Funds allocating to Japan by Manager Domicile (Billion US$) 


































Source: selected AsiaHedge and Eurekahedge Asia hedge fund data as of June 2005 











































Japan funds Asia Including Japan funds Global (incl. Japan) funds
 
Source: selected AsiaHedge and Eurekahedge Asia hedge fund data  
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 Chart XV.  Global Hedge Fund allocations to Single Managers by Geography 
 
Europe,  $279 BLN 
25%
Asia ex. Japan, 
$37 BLN, 3%
US & ROW,  
$750 BLN , 68%
Japan,  $46 BLN , 
4%
 
Asia ex Japan & Europe 
estimates courtesy of Hedge 
Fund Intelligence. Figures for 
Asia and Japan are likely to 
underestimate the impact of 
assets in distressed securities and 
do not include global funds 
which allocate to Asia. Assumes 
US$1.375 TLN industry and 
excludes fund of funds of 
US$325 MLN 





Appendix A: Classification of Hedge Fund Strategies 
 
This table provides the mapping of strategies provided by Eurekahedge and Hedge Fund 
Intelligence. They map to broad geography categories and broad strategy categories that were 
utilized to create a consistent, single merged database used in this research paper. The broad 
strategy categories derive from the CS-Tremont Index LLC strategy definitions which are briefly 
explained below. 
EurekaHedge AsiaHedge Broad Geography Broad Strategy 
Asia Australia AH ALSA$ Asia ex. Japan Long/Short Equity 
Asia Japan AH JLSY, AH JLS$ Japan Long/Short Equity 
Asia Other  Asia ex. Japan Long/Short Equity 
Asia ex-Japan AH AEJ$ Asia ex. Japan Long/Short Equity 
Asia inc-Japan AH AIJ$ Asia inc. Japan Long/Short Equity 
Europe  Global Long/Short Equity 
Global  Global Long/Short Equity 
Emerging managers AH EM (emerging 
markets) 
Global  Emerging Markets 
Convertible & Equity Arb  Global, Japan, Asia inc. 
Japan 
Multi-strategy 
Distressed AH DISS Japan, Asia inc. Japan Event Driven 
Event Driven AH ED Asia inc. Japan Event Driven 
Equities AH SPEC (specialist 
sector) 
Japan, Asia inc. Japan Long/Short Equity 
FI high yield AH AFI Japan, Asia inc. Japan Fixed Income Arb 
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Macro currency debt AH MAC Global Global Macro 
EurekaHedge AsiaHedge Broad Geography Broad Strategy 
CTA AH CTA Global Managed Futures 
Market Neutral AH AMN$, AH JMNY Japan, Asia inc. Japan Equity Market 
Neutral 
Mixed Arbitrage AH ARB$, AH ARBY Japan, Asia inc. Japan Multi-Strategy 
Multi-strategy AH Japan synthetic 
warrants 
Japan, Asia inc. Japan Multi-Strategy 
Stat Quant Arb  Japan, Asia inc. Japan Equity Market 
Neutral, Multi-
Strategy 
 AH COMM Global Global Macro 
 
Convertible Arbitrage is usually defined as investing in the convertible securities of a company. 
A typical investment is to be long the convertible bond and short the common stock of the 
company. Positions are designed to generate profits from the fixed-income security as well as the 
short sale of the stock, while protecting principal from market moves. 
Dedicated Short Bias is as yet not a visible, scalable hedge fund strategy in Asia. The strategy is 
to maintain a net short as opposed to pure short exposure. These managers take short positions in 
mostly equities and derivatives. The short bias manager’s portfolio must be constantly greater 
than zero to be classified in this category. 
Emerging Markets involves equity or fixed income investing in emerging markets around the 
world. As many emerging markets do not allow short-selling nor offer viable futures or other 
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derivative products with which to hedge, emerging market investing often employs a long-only 
strategy. 
Equity Market Neutral is designed to exploit equity market inefficiencies and usually involves 
being simultaneously long and short matched equity portfolios of the same size within a country. 
Market neutral portfolios are designed to be either beta or currency neutral or both. Well-
designed portfolios typically control for industry, sector, market capitalizations and other 
exposures. Leverage is often applied to enhance returns. 
Event Driven is often described as “special situations” investing designed to capture price 
movement generated by a significant pending corporate event such as a merger, corporate 
restructuring, liquidations, bankruptcy or reorganizations. A number of common sub-categories 
include: a) Risk/Merger Arbitrage in which specialists invest simultaneously long and short in 
companies involved in a merger or acquisition. Risk Arbitrageurs typically are long the stock of 
the company being acquired and short the stock of the acquirer. The principal risk is deal risk, 
should the deal fail to close. Risk arbitrageurs also invest in equity restructurings such as spin-
offs or “stub trades”. b) Distressed/High Yield Securities in which specialists invest in the debt, 
equity or trade claims of companies in financial distress or already in default. These securities 
typically trade at a substantial discount to par value due to difficulties in analyzing a proper value 
for such securities. This is generally a long-only strategy. c) Regulation D/Reg. D involves 
investments in micro and small capitalization public companies that are raising money in private 
capital markets. Investments usually take to form of a convertible security with an exercise price 
that floats or is subject to a look-back provision that insulates the investor from a decline in price 
of the underlying stock. 
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Fixed Income Arbitrage takes advantage from price anomalies between related interest rate 
securities. It includes interest rate swap arbitrage, US and non-US government bond arbitrage, 
forward yield arbitrage and mortgage-backed securities arbitrage. The mortgage-backed market 
is primarily US based, over the counter and particularly complex. 
Global Macro managers carry long and short positions in any of the world’s major capital or 
derivative markets. These positions reflect their views on overall market direction as influenced 
by major economic trends and/or events. The portfolios of these funds can include stocks, bonds, 
currencies and commodities in the form of cash or derivatives instruments. Most funds invest 
globally in both developed and emerging markets. 
Long/Short Equity involves equity-oriented investing on both the long and short sides of the 
market. The objective is not to be market neutral. Managers have the ability to shift from value 
to growth, from small to medium to large capitalization stocks and from net long position to a net 
short position. Managers may use futures and options to hedge. The focus may be country 
specific or sector specific such as in healthcare or some combination of both. Long/short equity 
managers tend to build and hold portfolios that are substantially more concentrated that those of 
traditional stock funds. 
Managed Futures invests in listed financial, commodity and currency futures markets around the 
world. The managers are usually referred to as CTA’s with trading disciplines usually divided 
into systematic (using price and market specific information for trading decisions) or 
discretionary (using a judgmental approach). 
Multi-Strategy funds are characterized by their ability to dynamically allocate capital among 
strategies falling within several traditional hedge fund disciplines.  The use of many strategies, 
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and the ability to reallocate capital between them in response to market opportunities, means that 
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